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Abstract The introduction of an insurance guaranty scheme can have significant in-
fluence on the pricing and capital structures in a competitive market. This contribution
summarizes the major findings of a working paper written by Schmeiser and Wagner
(Working Papers on Risk Management and Insurance (IVW-HSG), No. 80, 2010).
The effect on competitive equity-premium combinations is studied while considering
a framework with policyholders and equity holders where guaranty fund charges are
volume-based, as levied in existing schemes. Several settings with regard to the ori-
gin of the fund contributions are assessed and the immediate effects on the incentives
of the policyholders and equity holders are analyzed through a one-period contingent
claim approach. One result is that introducing a guaranty scheme in a market with
competitive conditions entails a shift of equity capital towards minimum solvency
requirements. Hence adverse incentives may arise with regard to the overall security
level of the industry.
Zusammenfassung Die Einführung eines Insolvenzsicherungsfonds in einem kom-
petitiven Marktumfeld kann einen erheblichen Einfluss auf die Preisgestaltung und
die Kapitalstruktur eines Versicherers ausüben. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt eine
Zusammenfassung der zentralen Erkenntnisse aus einem Arbeitspapier von Schmei-
ser und Wagner (Working Papers on Risk Management and Insurance (IVW-HSG),
No. 80, 2010) dar. Die Modellanalyse erfolgt dabei aus der Perspektive der Ver-
sicherungsnehmer und der Aktionäre und untersucht, welche Effekte sich durch
ein volumenbasiertes Insolvenzsicherungsfondssystem auf Eigenkapital-Prämien-
Kombinationen in einem optionspreistheoretischen Kontext ergeben. In der Analyse
This contribution summarizes the major findings of a working paper written by Schmeiser
and Wagner (2010) that was presented at the annual meeting of “Deutscher Verein
für Versicherungswissenschaft e.V.” in Berlin, March 2011.
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der Implikationen für die zentralen Stakeholdergruppen zeigt sich als ein Kernergeb-
nis, dass die Einführung eines Insolvenzsicherungsfonds Anreize zum Herabsetzen
des Eigenkapitals in Richtung Mindestsolvenzanforderungen schafft. Dadurch kön-
nen sich durch die in Rede stehenden Regulierung durch Insolvenzsicherungsfonds
tatsächlich kontraproduktive Effekte hinsichtlich der Sicherheit der Versicherungsin-
dustrie ergeben.
1 Introduction
In many countries, insurance guaranty schemes are set up to cope with part of the
obligations of insolvent insurers. Over the past decades, guaranty funds have been in-
troduced when a country’s insurance sector has assisted, as a cooperative effort with
the regulator, in the liquidation of one (or more) defaulting companies. One example
is the German life insurer Mannheimer Lebensversicherung (344,000 life insurance
contracts) which had been in a situation of financial distress and hence was absorbed
in 2003 by a funded rescue company named Protektor. Today, Protektor acts as an
insurance guaranty fund and a general rescue company for the German life insurance
industry.1 Recent turbulence in the financial markets stressed the need for a review
of the regulations in-force. The latter include solvency measurement (e.g., European
Union Solvency II), and the reconsideration, or installation where non-existent, of
customer guaranty systems—and this also for the banking and the insurance area.
While the review of banking deposit insurance systems in the European Union has
led to higher caps in the last year and months with homogenization by the end of 2011
(see, e.g., Council 2008), the insurance sector has no comparable comprehensive sys-
tem. Definitely, even if adequate supervision can reduce the default probability of
an insurer, making taxpayers, and the entire society, pay in the case of insolvencies
is difficult to legitimate. A recent example, even though the core insurance business
may not have been the main trigger, is the bailout of insurance giant AIG in 2008
where it is still unclear whether taxpayers ever will be fully repaid.
As part of the European Union’s response to the economic and financial crisis,2
the European Commission announced that it would review the adequacy of existing
guaranty schemes in the insurance sector. The initiative (see European Commission
2010a), based on work undertaken since 2001, is planned to lead to the adoption of a
White Paper by 2010, setting out a European solution on insurance guaranty schemes.
Whereas in the United States each state has two guaranty associations, one for life
and the other for property–liability insurance, both associations being incorporated
in national organizations, the landscape of insurance guaranty schemes in Europe is
heterogeneous. An extensive analysis of existing guaranty schemes in the European
Union in 2007 (Oxera 2007, p. 7) accounted for 13 countries out of the 27 Member
1Other considerable examples in Europe include the bankruptcy of the Danish insurer Plus Forsikring in
2002, Britain’s Independent Insurance in 2001, and France’s Europavie in 1997. Further case descriptions
and figures regarding the number of insurance failures, including the U.S.A., can be found, for example,
in Oxera (2007, Sect. 4.5f).
2See the European Union’s online portal. http://ec.europa.eu/financial-crisis.
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States, having introduced relevant schemes supporting either the life or non-life insur-
ance sectors, or part of these.3 The guaranty scheme system of the various countries
is very similar, but its extent is non-uniform. From a (cross-border) European per-
spective, many questions arise when facing the challenge of unification, or the fund
volume needed (see also European Commission 2010b). The lack of harmonized in-
surance guaranty scheme arrangements in the European Union hinders effective and
equal consumer protection. In light of the lessons drawn from the recent crisis, the de-
velopment of harmonized guaranty schemes could contribute to remedy the existing
deficiencies, while in particular not impeding the operation of the internal insurance
market by distorting cross-border competition. It thus seems important to us to point
out that, by 2010, about 26% of all life insurance policies in the European Union
and 56% of all non-life insurance policies were unprotected (European Commission
2010b).
One important aspect is that most of the existing insurance guaranty fund schemes
charge premiums that are not directly linked to insurer risks.4 From this, one can
expect adverse incentives for insurers and cross-subsidization between market play-
ers. This has been largely discussed in literature: Early analysis by Cummins (1988)
affirms that well designed insurance guaranty funds should demand risk-based pre-
mium payments, in order to avoid adverse incentives. With respect to regulation
implications, pricing aspects are further discussed, for example, by Cummins and
Lamm-Tennant (1994) and Cummins and Sommer (1996). The work by Duan and
Yu (2005) extends the Cummins (1988) model to a multi-period setting, calculating
insurance guaranty premiums in the presence of risk-based capital regulations. The
issue of a system with ex-post charges not being able to be organized in a truly risk-
based way due to the fact that the insolvent insurance company, which may have
been the riskiest one, is typically not charged at all, is extensively addressed, for ex-
ample, by Han et al. (1997, p. 1119). The merits of pre-funding and post-financing
are discussed for example by Yasui (2001, p. 13): ex-ante levies have the advantage
of enabling relatively quick handling of insolvency cases since funds for policyholder
compensation are always available. This is especially important in dealing with the
bankruptcy of a larger insurer, for which a considerable amount of funds needs to
be mobilized within a short period of time. Furthermore, the existence of a suffi-
cient amount of funds for policyholder protection ensures the visibility of a safety
net and thus contributes to the maintenance of public confidence in the industry.
However, the ready-to-use funds may induce moral hazard behavior of consumers,
companies and supervisors and, moreover, given its visibility, the lack of sufficient
funds may adversely affect public confidence. Also, while pre-funding allows better
predictability for member companies, in regard to (foreseen) future financial burdens,
post-financing has the advantage of requiring virtually no administration costs (such
as fund management costs) until an insolvency case comes out: member companies
3In addition, other protection mechanisms besides the introduction of an insurance guaranty fund are
discussed in Oxera (2007, Sect. 3). In this context, the reasons for the installation of an insurance guaranty
fund are given and the desired market outcomes, as well as the potential wrong incentives and transaction
costs, are derived (see Oxera 2007, Sects. 3.1–3.5).
4An exception from this rule is the German life insurance guaranty fund scheme, where charges depend
on company ranking according to their financial capacity, defined as equity relative to solvency margin.
722 H. Schmeiser, J. Wagner
can retain funds until these funds become of immediate necessity. Rymaszewski et al.
(2010) examined under which conditions a self-supporting insurance guaranty fund
can be beneficial for policyholders. In their framework, the concept of utility-based
premiums is introduced and possible diversification benefits are measured through a
change in utility for risk-averse policyholder collectives.
Another set of contributions analyzes the existing guaranty scheme systems, al-
most exclusively with respect to the U.S. system. Recent work by Bernier and Mah-
foudhi (2010) discusses guaranty schemes from Canada and the U.S. with respect to
the incentives due to ex-post levies. Feldhaus and Kazenski (1998) discuss model-
based alternatives, in particular bankruptcy prediction models and class rating, for
U.S. insurance guaranty schemes, with the perspective on a risk-based assessment
rather than the actual “flat-rate” feature where the assessment provides no penalties
to insurers who choose to engage in more risky operations. The affecting factors iden-
tified include the premium growth and concentration, level of loss reserves, retention
and financial leverage. Most closely to our approach, Sommer (1996) examines the
impact of an insurer’s level of insolvency risk on the prices that the insurer obtains for
its products in the property-liability insurance market. With regard to guaranty funds,
Sommer (1996) points out that in a system with flat-rate premium-based charges, not
only do guaranty funds not receive a higher premium for a higher-risk firm, but the
funds actually receive lower premiums from a risky firm than from a safe firm, since
the risky firm takes in less in premium revenue. This yields the wrong outcome of
reverse risk-based guaranty fund premiums. This element also appears in our later
discussion of stakeholder positions. Looking into effects on company organization,
the work of Ligon and Thistle (2007) shows that, in the presence of guaranty funds
that levy non-risk-adjusted premium-based charges, the riskiness of the policyholder
loss distribution affects the company organizational structure: heterogeneity in con-
sumer riskiness creates incentives for a separate insurance firm for each consumer
type.
Arising from the current effort in the European Union, the scope of this paper is
to analyze the effects of introducing insurance guaranty scheme systems in a mar-
ket with established equity-premiums. An overview of existing guaranty funds in the
European Union can be found in Oxera (2007), the latter is updated and extended in
Schmeiser and Wagner (2010). We focus on the introduction of an insurance guar-
anty scheme, in a setting of established competitive premiums with respect to equity.
It is assumed that the stakes of policyholders and equity holders are at equilibrium
with respect to risk-adequacy. This equilibrium is disturbed with the considered in-
troduction of a guaranty scheme. As is mostly done in practice, we assume the guar-
anty scheme to be funded through contributions calculated as a fraction of the com-
pany’s premium income and processed ex-ante. The guaranty fund ensures complete
policyholder coverage, if necessary considering complementary ex-post charges to
insurers or borrowing money from the state, for example. The case with limited li-
ability of the fund, i.e., expressed as a percentage or as an absolute cap on claims,
is discussed. Analysis is carried out using a one-period contingent claim approach.
Under the assumption that the insurer is solely charged by the fund, without charging
the policyholders back, the policyholder protection level and position is increased to
the detriment of the insurer, who is charged. A second case analyzes the situation
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where policyholders are charged directly by the fund. Whenever the contribution is
not “fair”, adverse incentives arise, e.g., through a reduction of the company security
level. Finally, a setting where policyholders are charged the fair premium correspond-
ing to their additional protection received, is considered. In this case, the policyholder
premiums and contributions are partially allocated to the insurer and the fund respec-
tively. Here, the allocation is crucial and the premium rate charged sets the safety
level of the insurance companies.
This summary is structured as follows: In Sect. 2, we introduce a model frame-
work where we formally describe the different stakeholder positions in a contingent
claim approach, in settings without and with a guaranty fund. In Sect. 3, we give a
synoptical overview of implications and incentives for the different stakeholders af-
ter the introduction of an insurance guaranty scheme. We present our conclusions in
Sect. 4.
2 Analysis of Stakeholder Positions in a Contingent Claim Model
This section introduces a one-period contingent claim model framework, for an in-
surance company based on a model first proposed by Doherty and Garven (1986).5
We consider the neo-classical framework of finance, i.e., we assume in particular
complete and arbitrage-free markets. The model framework used allows for a risk-
adequate positioning of the involved stakeholders. We adapt it here for three stake-
holders, namely policyholders and equity holders of the insurance company, as well
as, after its introduction, the insurance guaranty fund. The used claims structure ex-
plicitly takes insolvency risk into consideration: the value of the default put option
introduced below is a measure for the insurer’s safety level (see also, e.g., Phillips et
al. 1998 and Gatzert and Schmeiser 2008).
In a first step (see Sect. 2.1), initial and fair positions of policyholders and equity
holders are exposed in a setting without guaranty fund. All positions are assumed to
be at equilibrium from a risk-adequate point of view. This means that “fair” returns
on the initial contributions are derived from the policyholder premiums or the equity
holder capital respectively (see, e.g., Sherris 2006 or D’Arcy and Dyer 1997). In a
second step, an insurance guaranty fund is introduced (see Sect. 2.2). Depending on
the guaranty scheme funding mechanism, the risk-adequate equilibrium is disturbed.
The immediate effects on the positions of the various stakeholders are summarized in
Sect. 3.
2.1 Stakeholder Positions Without Guaranty Fund
Let E0 denote the insurance company’s initial equity paid-in by investors and let P0
be the up-front premium paid by the policyholders. Premiums are considered net of
costs. Hence, the opening cash flow is given by the sum
A0 = E0 + P0, (1)
5In order to focus on the core aspects regarding guaranty schemes, we will omit tax effects in our discus-
sion. See also Footnote 7.
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and can be invested in the capital market. At time t = 0, the nominal value of the
insurer’s liabilities, or of the policyholder claims, is L0.
2.1.1 Policyholder Position at Maturity
At the end of the period, at time t = 1, the position of the insured parties grants the
policyholders the coverage of their claims L1 if the company is solvent, i.e., if the
available assets A1 at time t = 1 exceed the liabilities L1. In the event of insurer
insolvency at time t = 1, when liabilities exceed the assets, i.e., L1 > A1, policy-
holders receive only the market value of the insurer assets. Assets A1 and liabilities
L1 are assumed to follow stochastic processes. Hence, the indemnity payment P1 to
policyholders at maturity is given by
P1 = min(L1,A1) = L1 − (L1 − A1)+, (2)
where (·)+ = max(·,0). The present value of the policyholder position, P0 , can be
written as
P0 = PV[P1] = PV[L1] − PV[(L1 − A1)+] = L0 − DPO0 , (3)
where PV stands for the valuation operator and the present value of the default put
option (DPO) is given by DPO0 = PV[(L1 − A1)+].
In (3), the present value of the claim costs is equal to the nominal value of the
issued liabilities L0 = PV[L1] = L0. The second term reflects the insolvency cost,
widely discussed, for example, by Cummins (1988), Butsic (1994) and by Sommer
(1996). When using this present value calculation, the risk is incorporated in the
insurance rate, since it reduces the default-free premium L0 to 
P
0 . This implies that
insurers with higher (lower) present value of the insolvency risk will charge lower
(higher) premiums.
2.1.2 Equity Holder Position at Maturity
The equity holder stake at maturity, E1, is residually determined by the difference
between the value of the assets A1 and the aggregated liabilities L1, i.e.,
E1 = A1 − P1 = (A1 − L1)+. (4)
Consequently, the present value of the equity holder position, E0 , is given by
E0 = PV[E1] = PV[(A1 − L1)+]. (5)
2.1.3 Fairness Condition
The value of the policyholders position P0 can be called a “fair” or competitive
premium, if it equals the initial contribution by the policyholders, i.e., if
P0 = P0 (6)
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holds. This situation leads to a net present value of zero for the insured parties, the
latter receiving a risk-adequate return with respect to their initial contribution. To be
called “fair” or arbitrage-free, the value of the equity holder payoff E0 must equal
their initial contribution E0, i.e.,
E0 = E0 . (7)
Since the sum of the equity holder and policyholder positions equals the available
assets, i.e., Et + Pt = At , for times t = 0,1, (6) is equivalent to (7), i.e., we have
P0 = P0 ⇔ E0 = E0 . (8)
Hence, an infinite number of initial equity-premium combinations E0–P0, with dif-
ferent values for the default put option DPO0 are possible. These lead to net present
values of zero for both equity holders and policyholders. From an economical point
of view, this means that insurance companies choose a specific “security” level, i.e.,
solvency-level, by defining the equity endowment E0. However, minimum capital re-
quirements in regulatory solvency frameworks define a lower bound for the solvency-
level, i.e., the insurer’s equity E0.
2.2 Three Settings for Funding a Guaranty Scheme
The introduction of an insurance guaranty fund with compulsory participation by all
insurance companies is considered under three different assumptions, with respect to
the source and magnitude of fund contributions levied from policyholders and equity
holders. Below, we introduce the different settings in detail and give a summary of
the various stakeholder situations—policyholder, equity holder and guaranty fund
positions—in Table 1 (see Sect. 3).
In all settings, let C∗0 denote the ex-ante mandatory contribution to the guaranty
fund. In exchange for the contribution C∗0 , the guaranty fund assures all policyhold-
ers a fraction β of their claims L1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, up to a maximum amount ,  ≥ 0.
In the case where β = 1 with  ≥ βL1 = L1, the scheme guarantees complete pro-
tection (100%) of their claims without cap (no bound on maximum amount), if their
insurer is insolvent at maturity. The case β = 0 corresponds to a situation without any
guarantee.6
2.2.1 Setting A: Funding of Guaranty Scheme by Insurance Companies
In a first setting, we assume that the guaranty scheme is funded ex-ante and entirely
by insurance companies. Furthermore, the levy is assumed not to be charged back
by the insurers to their policyholders. Hence policyholder payments are not affected
by the introduction of the guaranty fund and they pay the same risk premium to the
6 The derivation of the stakeholder positions in Sect. 2.2ff considers the general case 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,  ≥ 0 for
setting A. In order to simplify the formulation and keep the discussion to the core aspects, the presentation
of the other settings is limited to the case where the guaranty fund assures 100% of the policyholder claims
with no cap, i.e., we set β = 100% and  ≥ L1.
726 H. Schmeiser, J. Wagner
insurance company. This setting is realistic when justified higher premiums cannot
be implemented in the market. In practice, this is the case in a market where policy-
holders are not aware of the existing default risk of insurers and the limited protection
of their claims.
The contribution C∗0 charged to insurance companies is calculated as a fraction
α, 0 ≤ α < 1, of the premium volume P ∗0 . In fact, this is in line with most existing
insurance guaranty schemes, see, e.g., Schmeiser and Wagner (2010, Sect. 2). Note
that other allocation methods accounting for the net reserves, mathematical provi-
sions or number of policies could be represented similarly by adapting this model
framework.7
If E∗0 and P ∗0 denote the initial contributions at time t = 0 of equity holders and
policyholders respectively, the available assets A∗0 are given by A∗0 = E∗0 +P ∗0 −C∗0 .
If we assume that the initial investments E∗0 = E0 and P ∗0 = P0 are identical in both
situations, with and without guaranty scheme, we obtain
A∗0 = A0 − C∗0 . (9)
We assume that the assets in A∗0 are invested under the same conditions as A0.
Similarly to the situation without guaranty fund (see (2)), the indemnity payment
at time t = 1 from the insurance company with available assets A∗1 to the policyhold-
ers with claims L1 is given by
P
∗,A
1 = min(L1,A∗1) = L1 − (L1 − A∗1)+. (10)
In the presence of the above described guaranty scheme, let P ∗,F1 denote the pol-
icyholder indemnity payment from the fund at time t = 1. Since the fund guarantees
a fraction β of the policyholder claims up to a maximum , the policyholder aggre-
gated position P ∗1 = P ∗,A1 + P ∗,F1 is given by max(P ∗,A1 ,min(βL1,)), and hence
P
∗,F
1 = (max(P ∗,A1 ,min(βL1,)) − P ∗,A1 )+ = (min(βL1,) − P ∗,A1 )+. (11)
An illustration of the described setting and of the cash flows is given in Fig. 1.
2.2.2 Setting B: Guaranty Scheme Funded Directly by Policyholders
Secondly, we consider a setting where the guaranty fund charges policyholders di-
rectly, or through the insurers who charge the contributions integrally back to the
policyholders. In this situation, the insurance company, and hence its equity hold-
ers, are not affected. This system is in place in most countries for the special motor
insurance schemes where the premium paid by policyholders for car liability insur-
ance incorporates the fund levy. Some countries, e.g., Spain, have implemented such
a system explicitly in the funding rules of the guaranty scheme.
7 In this model framework we do not account for taxation, transaction costs and other frictional costs.
Since, for example, the ex-ante levies paid by the insurer to the guaranty fund would be deductible from
tax payments, the reduction of the latter have repercussions on the profit, the prices and the equity capital.
Price regulation and the impact of corporate taxes have been studied in details by Doherty and Garven
(1986), as well as by Gatzert and Schmeiser (2008).
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Fig. 1 Cash flows in setting A. Illustration of the cash flows with an insurance guaranty fund at times
t = 0 and t = 1 in setting A. Contributions C∗0 to the fund at time t = 0 originate from the insurance
company and are not charged back to policyholders, whose initial premium payment P ∗0 = P0 is not
affected. The indemnity payment to policyholders at time t = 1 comes partly from the insurance company
(P ∗,A1 ) and the fund (P
∗,F
1 )
The ex-ante contribution C∗0 charged to policyholders is calculated as a fraction α,
0 ≤ α < 1, of the premium volume P ∗0 . The guaranty fund is assumed to ensure full
policyholder claim protection (see Footnote 6, β = 100% and  ≥ L1).
If E∗0 and P ∗0 are the initial contributions of equity holders and policyholders at
time t = 0, the available assets in the insurance company are given by A∗0 = E∗0 +
P ∗0 − C∗0 . If we assume that E∗0 = E0 and P ∗0 = P0 + C∗0 , this implies that
A∗0 = E0 + P0 = A0. (12)
Comparing the insurer’s asset situation with that in setting A (see (9)), we note that
the policyholder contribution C∗0 to the fund has no influence on the insurer’s avail-
able capital.
Since A∗0 = A0, we have A∗1 = A1, and the indemnity payment P ∗,A1 from the
insurance company to the policyholders at time t = 1 is derived from (10),
P
∗,A
1 = P1 = L1 − (L1 − A1)+, (13)
and equals the insurer’s payment to the policyholders in the absence of a guar-
anty scheme (see (2)). Furthermore, the indemnity payment P ∗,F1 from the guaranty
scheme (offering full protection) yields the value of the insurer default put option,
i.e.,
P
∗,F
1 = (L1 − A1)+, (14)
such that P ∗1 = P ∗,A1 + P ∗,F1 = L1.
The cash flows in this setting are illustrated in Fig. 2.
2.2.3 Setting C: Guaranty Scheme Funded by Policy- and Equity Holders
Finally, we consider a guaranty scheme funded ex-ante by contributions from the
insurance companies (setting A), but where policyholders pay a (fair) premium to
their insurer corresponding to the cumulated protection received from the insurance
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Fig. 2 Cash flows in setting B. Illustration of the cash flows with an insurance guaranty fund at times
t = 0 and t = 1 in setting B. Contributions C∗0 to the fund at time t = 0 originate from the policyholders
whose initial premium payment P0 to the insurer is not affected. The total position P ∗0 corresponds to P0
complemented by the contribution C∗0 to the fund. The indemnity payment to policyholders at time t = 1
comes partly from the insurance company (P ∗,A1 = P1) and the fund (P ∗,F1 )
company and the guaranty fund. In other words, though the guaranty fund ensures full
protection of the policyholder liabilities, the latter pay the default risk-free premium
P ∗0 = L0 to the insurance company.
The insurer is charged a contribution C∗0 by the guaranty fund, calculated as a
fraction α, 0 ≤ α < 1, of the premium volume P ∗0 . In this case, the default risk-
free premium paid to the insurer is partially transferred to the guaranty fund. In this
setting, it is assumed that the fund fully ensures policyholder liabilities.
If E∗0 and P ∗0 are the initial contributions of equity holders and policyholders at
time t = 0, the available assets in the insurance company are given by A∗0 = E∗0 +
P ∗0 − C∗0 . We assume again that the initial investments E∗0 = E0 and we have P ∗0 =
L0 , hence
A∗0 = E0 + L0 − C∗0 = E0 + P0 + DPO0 − C∗0
= A0 + DPO0 − C∗0 , (15)
where DPO0 = PV[(L1 −A1)+] stands for the present value of the default put option
first introduced in (3). We assume that A∗0 is invested in the same assets as A0.
At time t = 1, the indemnity payment from the insurance company with available
assets A∗1, to the policyholders with claims L1 is given by P
∗,A
1 formally defined
in (10) (see setting A):
P
∗,A
1 = L1 − (L1 − A∗1)+.
Similarly, the formal description of the guaranteed fund’s payment P ∗,F1 to the poli-
cyholders is given by (11), which in the case with β = 100% and  ≥ L1 is written
as:
P
∗,F
1 = (L1 − P ∗,A1 )+ = (L1 − A∗1)+. (16)
The cash flows in this setting are illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3 Cash flows in setting C. Illustration of the cash flows with an insurance guaranty fund at times
t = 0 and t = 1 in setting C. Policyholders are assumed to have full protection of their claims through
the insurance company and the fund. They are charged the default risk-free premium (P ∗0 = L0 ). Con-
tributions C∗0 to the fund at time t = 0 originate from the insurance company. The indemnity payment to
policyholders at time t = 1 comes partly from the insurance company (P ∗,A1 ) and the fund (P ∗,F1 ).
3 Overview of Settings and Implications on Stakeholder Positions
In Table 1 we present a synoptical overview of the different settings introduced. The
settings considered and the main results on the stakeholder positions obtained are
recapitulated. The formal derivation of the effects and the discussion from the point
of view of the various stakeholders in each setting, as well as numerical illustrations
can be found in the working paper by Schmeiser and Wagner (2010).
4 Conclusion
An international landscape analysis of existing insurance guaranty funds is the basis
for the study of the effects of the introduction of guaranty scheme systems in mar-
kets with established equity-premiums at equilibrium. Fund contributions are in most
cases calculated as a percentage of the company premium volume and risk-weighting
in the contributions of the different market players is mostly inexistent.
The focus of the theoretical analysis lies in the study of the disturbance of the
established market equilibrium, with respect to policyholder premium payments and
insurer equity endowments, when a pre-funded guaranty scheme is introduced. The
stakeholder positions are analyzed in a one-period contingent claims model frame-
work allowing for a risk-adequate positioning. The claims structure used explicitly
takes insolvency risk, i.e., the insurer’s safety level, into consideration. The intro-
duction of the guaranty fund is considered under three different assumptions with
respect to the source and magnitude of fund contributions levied from policyholders
and equity holders.
Main results include that in all cases adverse incentives with regard to the in-
surer safety level arise whenever the guaranty fund contribution is not risk-adequate
and stakeholders are not charged fairly. The incentives include for equity holders the
lowering of the equity capital endowment down to the limits required by solvency
regulations, or for policyholders the change towards a company charging lower pre-
miums, i.e., with a lower safety level. Finally we conclude that, under the assumption
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Table 1 Recapitulation of implications and incentives for the different stakeholders after the introduction
of an insurance guaranty scheme
Setting Policyholder position Equity holder position Guaranty fund situation
A • Same premium payment
P ∗0 = P0.• Realistic when policy-
holders are unaware of
change of default risk
through the introduction
of a guaranty fund.
• NPV equals value of in-
surer DPO DPO0 .
• Contribution C∗0 = αP0
to the fund (no charge
back to policyholders).
• NPV is negative.
• Incentive to lower equity
E∗0 = Efair0 ≤ E0 to re-
store fair situation.
• NPV equals ∗,DPO0 −
C∗0 .• Self-financing only if
funds equal insurer’s
value of DPO.
B • Premium P ∗0 = P0 + C∗0 ,
C∗0 = αP ∗0 as fund contri-
bution.
• NPV equals to (DPO0 −
αL0 /(1 − α).
• If α > αfair =
DPO0 /
L
0 , incentive
to change to insurer with
lower premiums (equity)
to restore fair situation.
• No contribution to the
fund, E∗0 = E0.• NPV is unaffected.
• In practice insurer would
collect policyholder con-
tribution and transfer to
fund.
• NPV equals DPO0 −
C∗0 .• Self-financing only
if funds equal in-
surer’s value of DPO
(α ≥ αfair).
C • Premium P ∗0 = L0 =
P0 + DPO0 .• NPV equals to zero.
• Policyholders pay default
risk-free premium and get
full protection through the
combination of insurer
and guaranty scheme.
• Contribution C∗0 = αP0
to the fund, E∗0 = E0.• NPV zero if
C∗0 = DPO0 .• If situation is unfair,
incentive to adapt eq-
uity capital (and hence
DPO0 ) to restore fair sit-
uation. Parameter α fixes
target solvency level.
• NPV equals ∗,DPO0 −
C∗0 (see setting A).• If situation for in-
surers is fair, fund is
self-financing (adequate
value of assets in system
equity holders–guaranty
scheme).
Contributions C∗0 are ex-ante, calculated as a fraction of the premium volume αP0, and the guaranty fund is
supposed to offer full protection to policyholders. Notations refer to those introduced above. In particular:
NPV = Net Present Value, DPO = Default Put Option
of volume-based fund contributions, a unique fair situation for all stakeholders is
defined when setting the level of the fund contribution. In the same way, the over-
all’s industry safety level is fixed. Since the impact of the introduction of a guaranty
scheme can be huge, the magnitude of volume-based levies should be analyzed care-
fully, not only with regard to the needed funds but also with regard to the incentives
and implications generated.
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